There is a brief description of the probabilistic causal graph model for representing, reasoning with, and learn ing causal structure using Bayesian networks. It is then argued that this model is closely related to how humans reason with and learn causal structure. It is shown that studies in psychology on discounting (reasoning concern ing how the presence of one cause of an effect makes an other cause less probable) support the hypothesis that humans reach the same judgments as algorithms for do ing inference in Bayesian networks. Next, it is shown how studies by Piaget indicate that humans learn causal structure by observing the same independencies and de pendencies as those used by certain algorithms for learn ing the structure of a Bayesian network. Based on this indication, a subjective definition of causality is for warded. Finally, methods for further testing the accu racy of these claims are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
A new perspective on causation has emerged from re searchers in artificial intelligence. In efforts to create sys tems that can reason with causal relationship, they de veloped a probabilistic graphical model of causality. The probabilistic graphical structure for representing causal relationship is called a Bayesian network. The com bination of representing, reasoning with, and learning causal structure using Bayesian networks we term here as the Probabilistic Causal Graph (PCG) Model.
This model has proved useful in artificial intelligence and expert systems applications. However, is it related to how humans reason with and learn causal knowledge?
The importance of understanding human reasoning to artificial intelligence does need elaboration. Judea Pearl [1986, 1995] has long argued that humans perform infer ence with existing causal knowledge in the same way as a well-known algorithm for doing inference in a Bayesian network. In Section 3.1 we summarize his argument and cite research on human subjects that support it. Then, in Section 3.2 we present the main result of this paper.
That is, we hypothesize that humans learn causal knowl edge by observing the same independencies and depen dencies used by certain algorithms for learning the struc ture of a Bayesian network. We support this claim with results of studies by Piaget [1952 Piaget [ , 1954 Piaget [ , 1966 on infants and children. Our conjecture, together with Pearl's, con stitute a model of how humans reason with and learn causes. We begin in Section 2 with a brief description of the probabilistic causal graphical model.
THE PCG MoDEL
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model assumes that the causal relationships among a set of variables U can be modeled by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) D (called a Bayesian network) in which each node consists of an element of U, and a joint probability distribution P, on the variables in U, which satisfies the Markov and faithfulness conditions for D. The edges in 'D are meant to represent direct causal influences. Figure 1 shows a Bayesian network in which the variables have to do with the causal mechanisms underlying how pavement could get wet. These are probabilistic rather than determin istic relationships. For example, the pavement will not get wet even when the sprinkler is on if the pavement is covered with a blanket. Notice there is no edge from K to L because the sprinkler does not directly cause a slippery pavement. Rather it is only through making it wet that this happens. There are only edges from direct causes to effects. In general, if we found out the sprin kler were on, it should increase the probability that the pavement would be slippery because it would make it more probable that the pavement were wet. However, according to this model, if we already knew the pave ment was wet, there would be a fixed probability it was slippery. Finding out the sprinkler was on would not increase that probability. The idea is that knowledge of an effect's direct causes shields the effect from the influ ence of variables that can affect those causes. This is the Markov condition , which is stated formally as follows. A probability distribution P on the variables in 7J satisfies the Markov condition for 7J if the value assumed by a variable X in 1J is probabilistically independent of the values of all other variables in 1J, except the descendents of X, conditional on the parents of X.
Next we discuss the faithfulness condition. Consider again Figure 1 . Intuitively, the sprinkler being on should increase the probability of it being summer, which should therefore decrease the probability it had rained. The
Markov condition only requires that the sprinkler and rain be independent given the season; it does not require that they be dependent if we do not know the season.
Here is where the faithfulness condition comes in. A probability distribution P on the variables in 1J satisfies the faithfulness condition for 1J if all the conditional independencies true in P are entailed by the Markov condition applied to D.
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model includes algo rithms for reasoning with and learning causes. The next section discusses ones most pertinent to our research plans. Summaries of other algorithms are in [Pearl, 1988] , [Neapolitan, 1990] , [Spirtes et al, 1993] , [Beck erman et al, 1994] , [Glymour, 1996] , and [Castillo et al, 1997] .
THE PCG MODEL AND HUMAN

REASONING
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model does much to re fute Christensen's [1990, p.279] [1972] called this inference discounting. Several researchers ( [Jones, 1979] , [Quattrone, 1982] , [Einhorn and Hoga rth, 1982] , [McClure, 1989] ) have argued that studies indicate that in certain situations people discount less than is warranted. On the other hand, arguments that people discount more than is warranted also have a long history (See, [Kanouse, 1972] , and [Nisbett and Ross, 1980] ). In many of the discounting studies, individu als were asked to state their feelings about the presence of a particular cause when informed another cause was present. For example, a classic finding is that subjects who read an essay defending Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba ascribe a pro-Castro attitude to the essay writer even when informed that the writer was instructed to take a pro-Castro stance. Researchers interpreted these results as indicative of underdiscounting. Morris and Larrick [1995] argue that the problem in these studies is that the researchers assume that subjects believe a cause is sufficient for an effect when they do not. Mor ris and Larrick [1995] repeated the Castro studies, but used subjective probability testing instead of assuming, for example, that the subject believes an individual will always write a pro-Castro essay whenever told to do so (They found that subjects only felt it was highly proba ble this would happen). In subjective probability testing, the subject is given a problem that can be solved us ing applications of Bayes' rule, and then asked to judge the probability in each component of the problem along with the solution. A solution (called the normative so lution) is then obtained by applying Bayes' rule to the subject's subjective probabilities. Finally, that solution is compared to the subject's solution. When they re placed deterministic relationships by probabilistic ones, Morris and Larrick [1995] found that subjects discounted about normatively. This means, when reasoning with multiple causes, they approximately reached the same judgments as algorithms for doing inference in Bayesian networks.
3.2
LEARNING CAUSES
Next we present an argument that humans learn causal structure by observing the same independencies and de pendencies used by certain algorithms for learning the structure of a Bayesian network. Indeed, we argue that the very notion of causality develops from the observa tion of these independencies/dependencies.
AN ALGORITHM FOR LEARNING CAUSAL STRUCTURE
Part of our intuition concerning cause-effect relation ships is that an effect cannot precede one of its causes in time. Therefore, if we have the benefit of a time or dering of the variables, we can learn causal influences with an algorithm based on the theorem that follows.
First we need some notation. When two variables are independent conditional on some subset of variables, S (possibly empty), we denote this by I(X, YjS).
Theorem 1 Suppose a probability distribution P sat isfies the Markov and faithfulness conditions for some DAG D whose nodes are the elements in U. Then there is a directed path from X to Y in D if there is a third variable Z and a set of variables Sxy, such that Z and all of the elements in Sxy are not descendents of X, satisfying the following: Similar, more detailed algorithms, which do not re quire a time ordering of the variables, appear in [Pearl and Verma, 1991] , [Spirtes et al, 1993] , and [Glymour, 1996] .
WHAT IS A CAUSE?
Rather than offering an explicit definition of causality, the probabilistic causal graph model assumes that the probability distribution satisfies certain properties (the Markov and faithfulness conditions) we intuitively feel hold for causal relationships. Implicitly, a cause is then defined to be any directed link learned by algorithms like the preceding one. To discover a cause, the algo rithm must be given a set of variables. But how do we know what these variables are? Consider the following example taken from [Spirtes et al, 1993, p. 42] .
If C is the event of striking a match, and A is the event of the match catching on fire, and no other events are considered, then C is a di rect cause of A. If, however, we added B; the sulfur on the matchtip achieved sufficient heat to combine with the oxygen, then we could no longer say that C directly caused A, but rather C directly caused B and B directly caused A. Accordingly, we say that B is a causal mediary between C and A if C causes B and B causes A.
Clearly, we can add more causal mediaries. For ex ample, we could add the event D that the match tip is abraded by a rough surface. C would then cause D, which would cause B, etc. We could go much further and describe the chemical reaction that occurs when sulfur combines with oxygen. Indeed, it seems we can con ceive of a continuum of events in any causal description of a process. We see then that the set of observable variables is observer dependent. Apparently, an individ ual, given a myriad of sensory input, selectively records discernible events and develops cause-effect relationships among them. Therefore, for the purpose of modeling human thought, rather than assuming there is a set of causally related variables out there, it seems more appro priate to only ass ume that each individual develops a set of 'causal' relationships among variables, which are spe cific to the individual (although many are shared), and the individual reconstructs these relationships on-the-fly when reasoning.
What is this relationship among variables that the notion of causality embodies? It seems reasonable to assume that most human knowledge derives from sta tistical observations, and that therefore a causal rela tionship must recapitulate some statistical observation among variables. Should we look at the adult to learn what this statistical observation might be? As Piaget and lnhelder [1969, p. 157] note, 'Adult thought might seem to provide a preestablished model, but the child does not understand adult thought until he has recon structed it, and thought is itself the result of an evolution carried on by several generations, each of which has gone through childhood.' The intellectual concept of causality has been developed through many genera tions and knowledge of many (if not most) cause-effect relationship are passed on to individuals by previous gen erations. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. ix] note further 'While the adult educates the child by means of multiple social transmissions, every adult, even if he is a creative genius, begins as a small child.' So we will look to the small child, indeed to the infant, for the genesis of the concept of causality. We will discuss results of studies by Piaget. We will show how these results can lead us to a definition of causality as a statistical relationship among an individual's observed variables.
THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY
Piaget [1952, 1954, 1966] established a theory of the de velopment of sensori-motor intelligence in infants from birth until about age two. He distinguished six stages within the sensori-motor period. Our purpose here is not to recount these stages, but rather to discuss some observations Piaget made in several stages, which might shed light on what observed relationships the concept of causality recapitulates.
Piaget argues that the mechanism of learning 'consists in assimilation; meaning that reality data are treated or modified in such a way as to become incorporated into the structure ... According to this view, the organizing ac tivity of the subject must be considered just as important as the connections inherent in the external stimuli.'-[Pi aget and lnhelder, 1969, p. 5]. We will investigate how the infant organizes external stimuli into cause-effect re lationships.
The third sensori-motor stage goes from about the age of four months to nine months. Here is a description of what Piaget observed in infants in this stage (taken from [Drescher, 1991, p. 27 
]):
Secondary circular reactions are characteris tic of third stage behavior; these consist of the repetition of actions in order to reproduce fortuitously-discovered effects on objects. For example:
• The infant's hand hits a hanging toy. The infant sees it bob about, then repeats the gesture several times, later applying it to other objects as well, de veloping a striking schema for striking.
• The infant pulls a string hanging from the bass inet hood and notices a toy, also connected to the hood, shakes in response. The infant again grasps and pulls the string, already watching the toy rather than the string. Again, the spatial and causal na ture of the connection between the objects is not well understood; the infant will generalize the ges ture to inappropriate situations. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 10 ] discuss these inappropriate situations:
Later you need only hang a new toy from the top of the cradle for the child to look for the cord, which constitutes the beginning of a dif ferentiation between means and end. In the days that follow, when you swing an object from a pole two yards from the crib, and even when you produce unexpected and mechanical sounds behind a screen, after these sights or sounds have ceased the child will look for and pull the magic cord. Although the child's ac tions seem to reflect a sort of magical belief in causality without any material connection, his use of the same means to try to achieve differ ent ends indicates that he is on the threshold of intelligence. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 18 ] note that 'this early notion of causality may be called magical phenomenalist;
"phenomenalist"; because the phenomenal contiguity of two events is sufficient to make them appear causally The infant extends this relationship to believe there may be an arrow from Z to other desired results even when they were not preceded by Z. Drescher [1991, p. 28] states that the 'causal nature of the connection between the objects is not well understood.' Since our goal here In the behavior patterns of the support, the string , and the stick, for example, it is clear that the movements of the rug, the string, or the stick are believed to influence those of the subject (independently of the author of the dis placement).
If we let Z ='pull string hanging from bassinet hood', X='bassinet hood moves', and Y='toy shakes', at this stage the infant develops the relationship that Z is con nected to Y through X. At this point, the infant's model entails that Z and Y are dependent, but that X is a causal mediary and that they are independent given X. Using our previous notation, this relationship is ex pressed as follows:
The fifth stage infant shows no signs of mentally simu lating the relationship between objects and learning from the simulation instead of from actual experimentation. An infant who reaches the sixth stage without happening to have learned about (say) using a stick may invent that behavior (in response to a problem that requires it) quite suddenly.
It is in the sixth stage that the infant recognizes an object will move as long as something hits it (e.g. the stick); that there need by no specific learned sequence of events. Therefore, at this point the infant recognizes the movement of the bassinet hood as a cause of the toy shaking, and that the toy will shake if the hood is moved by any means whatsoever.
The argument here is not that the two-year-old child has causal notions like those of the adult. Rather that they are as described by Piaget and lnhelder [1969, p. 
13]:
It organizes reality by constructing the broad categories of action which are the schemes of the permanent object, space, time, and causal ity, substructures of the notions that will later correspond to them. None of these categories is given at the outset, and the child's initial uni verse is entirely centered on his own body and action in an egocentrism as total as it is un conscious (for lack of consciousness of the self).
In the course of the first eighteen months, how ever, there occurs a kind of Copernican revo lution, or, more simply, a kind of general de centering process whereby the child eventually comes to regard himself as an object among others in a universe that is made up of per manent objects and in which there is at work a causality that is both localized in space and objectified in things. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 90] feel that these early notions are the foundations of the concepts developed later in life:
The roots of logic are to be sought in the general coordination of actions (including ver bal behavior) beginning with the sensori-motor level, whose schemes are of fundamental impor tance . This schematism continues thereafter to develop and to structure thought, even verbal thought, in terms of the progress of actions, until the formation of the logico-mathematical operations.
Piaget found that the development of the intellectual notion of causality mirrors the development of the in fant's notion. This is discussed in Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 110]:
The stars "were born when we were born," says the boy of six, "because before that there was no need for sunlight." .. . Interestingly enough, this precausality is close to the ini tial sensori-motor forms of causality, which we called "magical-phenomenalist" in Chapter 1.
Like those, it results from a systematic assim ilation of physical processes to the child's own action, an assimilation which sometimes leads to quasi-magical attitudes (for instance, many subjects between four and six believe that the moon follows them .... ) But, just as sensori motor precausality makes way {after Stages 4 to 6 of infancy) for an objectified and spacialized causality, so representative precausality, which is essentially an assimilation to actions, is grad ually, at the level of concrete operations, trans formed into a rational causality by ass imilation no longer to the child's own action in their eg(} centric orientation but to the operations as gen eral coordination of actions.
In the period of concrete operations (between the ages of seven and eleven), the child develops the adult con cept of causality. According to Piaget, that concept has its foundations in the notion of objective causality de veloped at the end of the sensori-motor period. [1983] have already used catastrophe theory to model sudden belief changes. By studying human subjects, we can gain further insight into sudden learning. We plan to test the accuracy of the hypotheses forwarded in this paper and to learn more about how humans learn causes.
Next we briefly describ e our plans.
As discussed in Section 3.1, studies by Morris and Lar rick (1995] substantiate that humans reach normative judgments when reasoning with common causes. We plan to do more subjective probability testing to see if humans reach normative judgments when reasoning with indirect causes and with multiple effects. Subjec tive probability testing only examines the results of rea soning, not the process. That is, even jf humans reach normative judgments, it does not mean they reach them by traversing links as suggested by Pearl. We will use prime-probe concept pairing reaction time studies to test the cognitive representation of cause-effect relationships and whether humans reason by traversing links.
As to investigating how causes are learned, previous studies ( [Heider, 1944] , [Kelly, 1967] ) indicate that hu mans learn causes to satisfy a need for prediction and control of their environment. Putting people into an ar tificial environment, with a large number of cues, and forcing them to predict and control the environment should produce the same types of causal reasoning that occurs naturally. One option is some sort of computer game. Occasionally, the game would be interrupted, and subjects would be asked to perform reaction time tasks.
The goal would be to see how and when subjects learned new causal relationship, in particular to see how subjects learn in bursts.
